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Abstract: On May 9, 2010 euro zone countries announced the creation of the European 
Financial Stability Facility as a response to the sovereign debt crisis. This paper investigates the 
impact of this announcement on bank share prices, bank CDS spreads and sovereign CDS 
spreads. The main private beneficiaries were bank creditors, especially of banks heavily exposed 
to southern Europe and Ireland and located in countries characterized by weak public finances. 
Furthermore, countries with weak public finances and banking systems heavily exposed to 
southern Europe and Ireland benefited, as evidenced by lower sovereign CDS spreads. The 
combined gains of bank debt holders and shareholders exceed the increase in the value of their 
sovereign debt exposures, suggesting that banks saw their contingent claim on the financial 
safety net increase in value. 
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1  Introduction 
On Sunday May 9 2010, euro zone politicians, the ECB and the IMF laid out a new 
strategy to deal with the European sovereign debt crisis. Foremost, the euro zone countries 
announced the creation of the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) which was to provide 
loans to euro zone countries experiencing refinancing problems. The EFSF would have 
€440 billion at its disposal, with its own debt guaranteed by the set of euro zone countries.  At 
the same time, the IMF and the European Financial Stabilization Mechanism were to make 
€250 billion and €60 billion available, respectively, for external support to euro zone countries, 
bringing the total amount earmarked for such support to €750 billion. Simultaneously, the ECB 
stated that it was willing to start purchasing euro zone debt in the secondary market in an effort 
to contain the yields on these instruments.  
The EFSF can provide loans only to euro zone governments. The immediate effect of its 
creation should be to reduce the probability of an imminent default by heavily indebted euro 
zone countries, possibly at the expense of a somewhat higher probability of default of non-
recipient, euro zone countries that guarantee the EFSF debt.  
   European banks can be materially affected by the new EFSF as well. European banks 
hold large portfolios of European sovereign debt, and the market value of these debts is impacted 
immediately by a change in the creditworthiness of euro zone governments. More indirectly, 
European banks rely on their national governments for bailout support in case they experience 
financial distress. The EFSF increases the access to finance for heavily indebted euro zone 
countries, thereby making it more likely that these countries can support their distressed banks. 
However, the EFSF reduces the residual fiscal capacity of its guarantor countries, possibly 
reducing the value of their financial safety nets to their resident banks. This suggests that the 
impact of the EFSF on euro zone banks depends on the size and composition of their sovereign 
debt portfolios and also on their country of residence. 
The announcement of the EFSF triggered sharp reactions in financial markets. European 
bank share prices rose sharply on the Monday after the announcement, to give back gains in the 
following days. CDS spreads on bank liabilities and on sovereign debts, in turn, fell immediately 
and remained at lower levels in subsequent trading sessions. 
This paper presents an event study of the impact of the EFSF announcement on bank 
share prices, bank CDS spreads, and sovereign CDS spreads. In particular, we relate movements 3 
 
in these market prices to data on bank-level sovereign debt portfolios, as made available by the 
Committee of European Bank Supervisors (CEBS) following EU-wide bank stress tests in early 
2010, and to government finance variables. The bank stock excess return regressions are based 
on a sample of 46 European banks, while the bank CDS regressions use data for 32 banks. The 
sample of country-level CDS spreads contains 18 observations. 
Our main results are as follows. Bank stock excess returns are positively and significantly 
related to bank exposures to Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain (the PIIGS countries), 
and not to other EU sovereign exposure. Further, bank stock excess returns for banks located 
outside the euro zone countries are positively related to a country’s government debt-to-GDP 
ratio and its public deficit-to-GDP ratio. This could reflect that countries with weak public 
finances offer financial safety nets to their banks with relatively low valuations as implicit in 
bank share prices. An increase in the quality of a bank’s sovereign debt portfolio, following the 
EFSF announcement, may therefore lead to a relatively small offsetting reduction in the 
valuation of the financial safety net of banks located in countries with strained public finances. 
For euro zone banks, in contrast, we find that bank stock excess returns are negatively related to 
the government debt and deficit ratios, perhaps because bank stock investors expected bailouts of 
heavily indebted euro zone countries that would be more favorable to them. Banks located in the 
euro zone are estimated to have benefited more from the EFSF announcement than banks located 
in non-euro zone countries, with the exception of banks located in the euro zone countries with 
the highest government-debt and deficit ratios.  
Changes in bank CDS spreads, in turn, are negatively related to banks’ PIIGS sovereign 
exposures, but they are positively related to banks’ non-PIIGS euro zone sovereign exposures. 
This is evidence that the EFSF announcement led to an increased valuation of PIIGS debt as 
reflected in bank CDS spreads, and to a reduced valuation of non-PIIGS euro zone debt. This 
may reflect that the creation of EFSF improved the repayment prospects for PIIGS countries, at 
the expense of reduced repayment prospects for non-PIIGS countries. Bank CDS spreads further 
decline more, if a bank is located in a country with weaker public finances. 
Similarly, sovereign CDS spreads decline with a national banking system’s exposure to 
PIIGS sovereign debt, while they increase with a national banking system’s exposure to non-
PIIGS debt. Sovereign CDS spreads in addition decline relatively much for euro countries with 
weak public finances. This is further evidence that the EFSF transferred creditworthiness to 4 
 
PIIGS countries with weak public finances, possibly at the expense of the creditworthiness of 
non-PIIGS euro zone countries. 
On the basis of our regression output, we can calculate the change in the values of banks’ 
assets, shares and liabilities insofar as these depend on a bank’s PIIGS sovereign exposure. 
Interestingly, the calculated combined change in the value of banks’ shares and liabilities far 
exceeds the calculated change in the value of banks’ PIIGS exposures themselves. The creation 
of the EFSF thus appears to have benefited investors with claims on banks beyond the increase in 
the valuation of sovereign debts in bank portfolios. This suggests that bank stock and liability 
holders collectively benefit from lower expected costs of bank distress or higher expected 
payouts from national financial safety nets.   
Several papers have previously examined market reactions to national bank bailouts. 
Ejsing and Lemke (2009) show that the decline in banks’ CDS spreads upon the announcement 
of rescue packages by European governments in 2008 were accompanied by sovereign CDS 
spread rises, as investors may have perceived the bailouts as credit risk transfers from the private 
to the public sector. They also show that both bank and sovereign credit risk is associated with a 
common (Europe-wide) macroeconomic factor, to which the sensitivity of bank (sovereign) CDS 
spreads declined (increased) after the bailout announcements. Attinasi et al. (2009) also 
document private-to-public credit risk transfers induced by European bank bailout 
announcements, and they find that the size of the packages is not significantly correlated with 
changes in risk spreads. They interpret this result as a sign that investors regard the packages as 
commitments to bail out banks, regardless of the size of the present interventions. 
  King (2009) carries out an event study of rescue package announcements in six countries, 
including the United States, after the Lehman default. Comparing abnormal stock market 
movements of bank shares and CDS spreads, he finds that government interventions primarily 
benefited creditors, whereas stock prices continued to decline after an initial increase in most 
countries. The exception is the US, where shareholders saw increased valuations, which the 
author attributes to more favorable conditions of the US bailout. The BIS (2009) reaches a 
similar conclusion in its comprehensive analysis of the rescue packages seen between October 
2008 and April 2009 in ten countries. These bailouts were associated with declining bank CDS 
spreads, but stock prices dropped as well. This suggests that the rescue packages were successful 
at decreasing expected credit losses on bank liabilities. However, the interventions decreased 5 
 
existing shareholders’ earning and voting rights, and might have lowered the expected 
profitability of banks. 
Sgherri and Zoli (2009) look into the determinants of European sovereign CDS spreads. 
They find that spread changes are primarily driven by a common time-varying factor, closely 
related to global risk appetite, but that since the beginning of 2009 markets have become more 
concerned about the fiscal consequences of potential bailouts of the domestic financial system 
and future debt dynamics. Similarly, Gerlach and Schulz (2010) find that sovereign bond spreads 
are determined by an aggregate risk factor and its interactions with indicators of the size and 
structure of national banking sectors. Specifically, when aggregate risk increases countries with 
large banking sectors and low equity ratios experience a greater widening in yield spreads. 
Dieckmann and Plank (2011), in turn, find that a country with a larger financial sector faces 
higher CDS spreads – even after controlling for sovereign leverage, i.e. the government debt to 
GDP ratio. Furthermore, sovereign CDS spreads move together with the health of the financial 
system – this is true for local and global shocks to the financial sector. 
  The two-way feedback between the banking system and the public finances is the focus 
of Acharya et al. (2011), who provide a theoretical model of how banking and sovereign CDS 
spreads are interrelated. Bank bailouts lead to a deterioration of the public finances, and they 
increase the incentives to default on sovereign debt. In the model, a large outstanding amount of 
government debt lowers a government's ability to undertake a bailout, and at the same time it 
increases the probability of sovereign default. Panageas (2010a, b) considers bank bailouts in an 
optimal taxation framework, yielding that a government may wish to bail out a bank to prevent 
the deadweight losses associated with a bank collapse.     
Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2010) provide empirical evidence that banks may have 
become too big to save. They find that bank valuation is negatively related to public deficits for 
systemically large banks, while banks’ CDS spreads are positively related to public deficits. 
These results suggest that countries are experiencing fiscal constraints in providing a financial 
safety net to their banks. 
  The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the data, and section 3 
presents the empirical results. Section 4 provides some calculations of the impact of the creation 
of the EFSF on the absolute values of bank shares, bank liabilities, and bank sovereign 
portfolios. Section 5 concludes. 6 
 
2  The data 
We obtain data on banks’ exposures to government debts of EU member states from the  
EU-wide stress tests conducted under the auspices of the Committee of European Banking 
Supervisors in early 2010. The stress tests covered 91 European banks, representing 65% of the 
European banking market in terms of assets. Our exposure data are net of impairment and cover 
debt held in both the trading book and the bank book. The exposure data and other balance sheet 
variables used in this study reflect consolidated statements. We restrict ourselves to banks that 
are publicly listed, which reduces the sample to 46 banks. Table 1 provides information about 
banks’ sovereign exposures aggregated by country of residence. Banks located in the UK have 
the largest aggregate sovereign exposure of €216 billion, followed by Italian and German banks 
with €165 billion and €145 billion, respectively.  
We can divide a bank’s sovereign exposure by its total assets to obtain a measure of its 
relative exposure. As seen in Table 1, banks in Austria, Belgium, Greece, Hungary, Poland, and 
Malta have an exposure-to-assets ratio exceeding 6 percent, while the average sovereign 
exposure-to-assets ratio is 2.31 percent for the 18 countries in the table. Sovereign debt-to-assets 
ratios for the 46 individual banks in our sample are provided in Table A1 in the Appendix.  
  Bank stock excess returns are calculated using stock price value data obtained from 
Datastream for one-day, three-day, and five-day event windows centered on the event date of 
May 10, 2010. Specifically, we calculate excess return,    
 , of bank i for an event window of L 
days using the following formula: 
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where    
  is the closing market value of bank i on day s in euros, and t is the event day of May 
10, 2010.  In this expression,    is the estimated market beta of bank i based on a 6-month 
sample of daily returns in the period from the beginning of October 2009 to the end of March 
2010. As a proxy for the market portfolio, we use the MSCI World Index in euros.
1  
                                                 
1 We calculate excess returns relative to a worldwide stock market index, as the event had a material effect on 
national market indices. 7 
 
  As measures of changes in bank and sovereign debt values, we use CDS spread changes 
over the event windows.
2 We use CDS spreads on senior unsecured bonds for five-year 
contracts, as these contracts are the most liquid. Also, we restrict the sample to CDS contracts 
with a modified restructuring (MR) clause in the case of banks following Jorion and Zhang 
(2007).
3 This yields a sample of 32 bank CDS spread changes, and a sample of 18 sovereign 
CDS spread changes for EU countries where at least 1 of the 46 banks in our sample is located. 
All CDS spread data are taken from Datastream. In the regressions, the five-year sovereign CDS 
spread as of the pre-event date of May 5, 2010 will be used as an index of national 
creditworthiness and fiscal capacity. 
At the country level, we use two additional indices of the health of public finances. First, 
government debt is the consolidated gross debt of the general government as a percentage of 
GDP at the end of 2009. Second, fiscal deficit is the net borrowing of the general government as 
a percentage of GDP at the end of 2009. Government debt and fiscal deficit figures are from 
Eurostat. Finally, we construct dummy variables for both banks and countries that indicate 
whether a bank is located in a euro zone country, or whether a country is a euro zone member 
country.  
  Figure 1 plots the average excess returns for banks located in PIIGS countries and other 
EU countries during the period of April and May of 2010 surrounding the event day of May 10. 
Bank share prices declined sharply especially in PIIGS countries in April and early May prior 
event day. On the event day, bank stocks experienced excess returns of on average 7.6 percent 
for the 46 banks in our sample, with bank shares in PIIGS countries rising relatively much. 
However, bank share prices reversed their gains in subsequent days. Over a three-day event 
window, the average bank stock excess return had declined to 3.7 percent, while over a five-day 
event window it even became negative at -1.4 percent. The reversal of the immediate bank share 
gains following the announcement cannot be explained by additional news with severe negative 
implications for bank valuations, as is evident from a summary of news items surrounding the 
event day of May 10, 2010 provided in A2 in the Appendix. Instead, the reversal of initial bank 
stock gains appears to reflect a reappraisal of the implications of the announcement itself for 
                                                 
2  We  do  not  to  work  with  abnormal  or  excess  CDS  spread  changes,  as  the  announcement  might  have  had  a 
significant effect on CDS spread indices. 
33  Modified  restructuring  clauses  are  part  of  the  ISDA  documentation  since  2001.  MR  limits  the  maturity  of 
obligations to be delivered after the credit event. 8 
 
bank valuation. Similar patterns of stock price movements after the announcements of national 
bank rescue packages in the fall of 2008 are noted by King (2009) and the BIS (2009). In all 
these instances, bank stock investors appear to have concluded that the bailouts primarily are to 
the benefit of bank creditors. 
  In analogous fashion, Figure 2 plots the development of average CDS spreads for banks 
located in PIIGS countries and other EU countries during April and May of 2010. Throughout 
this period, banks located in PIIGS countries have significantly higher CDS spreads than banks 
located in other EU countries. CDS spreads for both groups of banks rose sharply prior to the 
event day, to decline subsequently. The one-day decline in average bank CDS spread following 
the event was 38.0 basis points. Over three-day and five-day event windows, the declines in 
average bank CDS spreads were somewhat smaller at 23.1 basis points in both instances.  
In Figure 3, we display the average country-level CDS spreads for PIIGS countries and 
other EU countries during April and May of 2010. As in the case of bank CDS spreads, average 
country CDS spreads rose sharply before the event day and fell off significantly afterwards, 
especially for PIIGS countries. In fact, the developments of average bank and country CDS 
spreads in Figures 2 and 3 for PIIGS countries and non-PIIGS countries are remarkably similar, 
indicating that market operators see the fortunes of banks and their countries of residence as 
tightly linked.
4 The average decline in country CDS spreads over one-day, three-day, and five-
day event windows is rather stable at 55.0, 59.4 and 53.9 basis points, respectively.  
Table 2 provides formal tests of whether the mean bank excess returns, and changes in 
bank and country CDS spreads over the various event windows are different from zero. 
Interestingly, the mean bank excess return of -1.4 percent over the five-day window is only 
significantly different from zero at the 10 percent level. The declines in bank and country CDS 
spreads over this event-window, in contrast, are both significant at the 5 percent level. 
  To conclude this section, Figure 4 provides plots of bank excess returns and bank and 
country CDS spreads during April and May 2011 for 8 selected EU countries: France, Germany, 
Greece, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom. The individual-
country pictures show some dispersion among the effects of the event on bank excess returns. In 
particular, bank excess returns for 4 non-PIIGS countries (France, Germany, Netherlands, and 
                                                 
4 See also Sgherri and Zoli (2009) and Dieckmann and Plank (2011) for evidence on the co-movement of bank and 
country CDS spreads at a time of financial crisis. 9 
 
the United Kingdom) are higher at the end of May than just prior to the event, while bank excess 
returns continued to decline in Greece and Ireland after the event. The individual-country 
pictures confirm that both bank and country CDS spreads increased gradually during April. 
Greek sovereign CDS spreads, in particular, increased from an initial 352 basis points on April 1 
to 893 basis points on April 27, when Standard & Poor’s downgraded Greek debt to junk status. 
During the same period, the insurance cost of German sovereign risk climbed from 31 basis 
points to 52 basis points, a remarkable 67% increase. After the event, bank and country CDS 
spreads tended to decline, although we see that the CDS spread for Ireland continued to climb. 
  Table 3 provides descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for variables used in the 
bank stock excess return regressions (in Panel A), the bank CDS change regressions (in Panel B), 
and the sovereign CDS change regressions (in Panel C). The table indicates that the bank 
exposure and national government debt variables are positively correlated. In particular, in Panel 
A we see that the correlation between total bank exposure to government debt relative to assets 
and national government debt relative to GDP is 0.47. 
3  Regression results 
In this section we present results of regressions of bank excess returns, bank CDS spread 
changes and country CDS spread changes in turn. 
 
3.1  Bank stock excess returns 
In Table 4, the dependent variable is the bank stock excess stock return calculated over a 
five-day event window. Standard errors control for clustering at the country level. In regression 
1, the bank stock excess return is related to a bank’s total EU sovereign debt exposure relative to 
bank assets, yielding a positive coefficient of 0.338 that is statistically insignificant. Regression 2 
includes separate variables for a bank’s sovereign exposures to PIIGS countries, non-PIIGS euro 
zone countries, and non-euro zone countries, all relative to assets. In this regression, the PIIGS 
exposure variable obtains a coefficient of 0.726 that is significant at 1 percent, while the other 
two exposure variables obtain insignificant coefficients.
5 The estimated coefficient of 0.726 
                                                 
5 We obtain similar results if we include only one of the exposure variables at a time (unreported). 10 
 
implies that an increase in the PIIGS variable by one standard deviation of 0.03 (as seen in Table 
3, Panel A) is estimated to increase the bank excess return by 0.022 (=0.726*0.03), which is 
about half the standard deviation of the excess return of 0.05. Thus, the impact of a bank’s PIIGS 
exposure on its excess return is economically significant. 
Regression 3 includes national government debt-to-GDP ratio. This variable obtains an 
insignificant coefficient, while the coefficients for the exposure variables remain largely 
unchanged. Alternatively, regression 4 includes the fiscal deficit-to-GDP, yielding an 
insignificant estimated coefficient and similar estimated coefficients for the exposure variables. 
Regression 5 instead includes the sovereign CDS spread as of March 30, 2010. This public 
finance proxy also obtains an insignificant coefficient, with little impact on estimated 
coefficients for the exposure variables. Taken together, regressions 3-5 suggest that a bank’s 
stock prices reaction to the EFSF announcement primarily reflects its PIIGS exposure, and not its 
national public finances.  
The EFSF, however, is a vehicle for intergovernmental credits among euro zone 
countries, which suggests that the relationship between bank excess returns and the national 
public finances may be different for the set of euro zone countries compared to non-euro zone 
EU countries. To check this, we re-estimate regressions 3-5 after including a euro zone dummy 
and an interaction of this dummy with the included public finance proxy. The results are 
presented as regressions 6-8. In regression 6, we see that the government debt variable obtains a 
coefficient of 0.001 that is significant at 1 percent. The positive coefficient on the government 
debt variable suggests that bank excess returns are positively related to government indebtedness 
for non-euro zone EU countries. To explain this, note that countries with high government debts 
are less likely to be able to offer their banks generous bailouts, if they become distressed. Thus, 
there is limited potential for the contingent claims that banks have on the financial safety nets of 
countries with weak public finances to be reduced if underlying asset values rise. Hence, an 
increase in the valuation of the sovereign debts of heavily indebted euro zone countries following 
the EFSF announcement may increase bank stock prices relatively much in non-euro zone EU 
countries with high government debts. 
In regression 6, the interaction of the government debt variable with the euro zone 
dummy obtains a coefficient of -0.002 that is significant at the 1 percent level. The sum of the 
coefficients on the government debt variable and its interaction term with the euro zone dummy 11 
 
is negative at -0.001 (= 0.001-0.002). For euro zone countries, we thus find that bank stock 
excess returns are negatively related to government indebtedness. A potential reason is that bank 
stock investors in heavily indebted euro zone countries were disappointed by the scale and scope 
of the EFSF, as they realized that any benefits from EFSF would accrue disproportionately to 
bank debt holders rather than to bank shareholders. The euro zone dummy in regression 6 obtains 
a positive coefficient of 0.186 that is significant at 1 percent. The coefficients on the euro zone 
dummy and its interaction with the government debt variable together suggest that a bank located 
in the euro zone benefited from the creation of EFSF relative to a bank outside the euro zone if 
government debt is less than 93 percent of GDP. This implies that banks located in the average 
euro zone country, with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 63 percent, benefited from the EFSF relative to 
banks in a non-euro zone country, while banks located in Belgium and Greece, with debt-to-GDP 
ratios of 96 and 127 percent respectively, did not benefit. 
In regression 7, the deficit variable obtains a positive coefficient of 0.005 that is 
significant at 1 percent. Hence, bank stock excess returns for banks located outside the euro zone 
are estimated to be positively related to the country’s deficit to GDP ratio, possibly because 
countries with high deficits cannot afford strong financial safety nets that imply high contingent 
claims of banks on these systems. The interaction of the financial deficit variable with the euro 
zone dummy obtains a negative coefficient of -0.007 that is significant at 5 percent, while the 
euro zone dummy itself obtains a coefficient of 0.086 that is significant at 1 percent. This suggest 
that within the euro zone banks located in high-deficit countries gained relatively little form the 
announcement of the EFSF, perhaps because any such deal was expected in some way to be 
more generous to bank shareholders in high-deficit countries. The estimated coefficients for the 
euro zone dummy and its interaction with the deficit variable together suggest that banks located 
in a euro zone country benefited from the EFSF announcement relative to banks located outside 
the euro zone if the deficit-to-GDP ratio was less than 12.3 (=0.086/0.007) percent. In 2009, 
Greece and Ireland had deficit-to-GDP ratio of 15.4 and 14.4 percent respectively, which 
suggests that banks located in these countries did not benefit from the EFSF event relative to 
banks outside the euro zone. 
Finally, in regression 8 the sovereign CDS spread variable and its interaction with the 
euro zone dummy variable obtain coefficients that are statistically insignificant. The euro zone 
dummy variable ifself, however, obtains a coefficient of 0.064 that is significant at 1 percent, 12 
 
indicating that banks inside the euro zone benefited from the creation of the EFSF relative to 
banks outside the euro zone. Overall, our regression results provide some evidence that banks in 
euro zone countries benefited from the creation of EFSF relative to banks outside the euro zone 
countries, with the possible exception of banks located in the euro zone countries with the 
highest debt-to-GDP and deficit-to-GDP ratios. 
 
3.2  Bank CDS spreads 
Table 5 shows the results of regressions of 5-year bank CDS spread changes, which are 
otherwise analogous to the bank stock excess return regressions in Table 4. In regression 1, the 
total exposure variable is estimated with a negative but insignificant coefficient. In regression 2, 
bank’s total exposure is split up into its PIIGS exposure, its non-PIIGS EMU exposure, and its 
non-EMU exposure. The PIIGS variable obtains a coefficient of -761.6 that is significant at the 5 
percent level, while the other two exposure variables obtain insignificant coefficients. The 
estimated coefficient of -761.6 implies that a one standard deviation increase in the PIIGS 
variable of 0.02 (from Table 3, Panel B) reduces the bank CDS spread by 15.23 (= 761.6*0.02) 
basis points, which is about a third of the standard deviation of the CDS spread change of 41.04. 
Thus, the impact of the PIIGS exposure variable on the bank CDS spread change is economically 
significant. 
In regression 3, we add the government debt variable to regression 2. This public finance 
proxy obtains an insignificant coefficient, while the estimated coefficient for the PIIGS variable 
is almost unchanged at -718.9 and significant at 5 percent. Regression 4 includes the deficit 
variable, yielding insignificant coefficients for this variable as well as the exposure variables. In 
regression 5, in turn, the CDS spread variable obtains a negative coefficient of -0.193 that is 
significant at 1 percent, while the three exposure variables obtain insignificant coefficients. 
Together, regressions 3-5 show some evidence that changes in bank CDS spreads following the 
EFSF announcement reflect a bank’s PIIGS exposure as well as the national public finances of 
the bank’s country of location. However, the paucity of observations and positive correlations of 
a bank’s PIIGS exposure with national public finance variables make it difficult to estimate these 
various influences on bank CDS spreads precisely. 13 
 
Regressions 6-8 differ from 3-5 in that they include the euro zone dummy and an 
interaction term of the euro zone dummy with the included public finance proxy. In regression 6, 
the PIIGS variable obtains a coefficient of -596.2 that is significant at 5 percent, while the euro 
zone dummy and its interaction with government debt are statistically insignificant. In regression 
7, we see that the fiscal deficit variable obtains a coefficient of 0.321 that is significant at 10 
percent, suggesting that the reduction in bank CDS spreads following the event are smaller in 
non-euro zone countries with relatively high deficits. This is somewhat surprising, as one would 
expect bank CDS spreads to be relatively sensitive to the quality of a bank’s assets if the 
financial safety net is less creditable on account of high public deficits. The interaction of the 
deficit variable and the euro zone dummy obtains a negative coefficient of -9.077 that is 
significant at 1 percent. The large size of this coefficient, compared to the estimated coefficient 
of 0.321 for the deficit variable, suggests that CDS spreads for banks in euro zone countries 
declined relatively much in high-deficit countries. A potential reason is that bank CDS spreads 
are more sensitive to asset quality in countries with high deficits due to the relative fragility of 
the financial safety net. The euro zone dummy obtains a coefficient of 26.54 that is significant at 
the 10 percent level. This estimated coefficient and the one for the interaction of the euro zone 
dummy and the deficit variable together suggest that a bank in the euro zone saw its CDS spread 
decline relative to a bank outside the euro zone if located in a country with a deficit larger than 
2.92  (=26.54/9.077) percent. In 2009, these were all euro zone countries, apart from Estonia, 
Finland and Luxembourg with deficits of 1.7, 2.5, and 0.9 percent, respectively. Finally, in 
regression 8, we see that the interaction of the CDS spread and the euro zone dummy obtains a 
coefficient of -0.224 that is significant at 5 percent, to suggest that banks in the euro zone saw 
their CDS spreads decline relatively much if located in a country with a high sovereign CDS 
spread, possibly on account of the fragility of the financial safety net in countries with high 
sovereign CDS spreads. 
 
3.3  Country CDS spreads 
Table 6 presents the results of regressions of changes in sovereign CDS spreads in five-
day windows around the announcement. The sample contains a limited number of 18 countries 
where at least one of the banks included in the stress test conducted by the CEBS is located. The 14 
 
table contains three panels. In Panels A, B and C, the included public finance variable is the 
government debt, the public deficit and the sovereign CDS spreads, respectively.  
In regression 1 of Panel A, sovereign CDS spread changes are related to the total 
sovereign exposure of resident banks relative to GDP, yielding an estimated coefficient that is 
statistically insignificant. In regression 2, we include the government debt variable. The 
government debt variable obtains a coefficient of -2.841 that is significant at the 10 percent level, 
while the total sovereign exposure of banks is statistically insignificant. A negative relationship 
between the sovereign CDS change and government debt is to be expected if the EFSF serves to 
transfer creditworthiness from lowly indebted governments to highly indebted governments.  
In regression 3, the total sovereign exposure variable is broken down into exposures to 
PIIGS, non-PIIGS EMU and non-EMU countries. The PIIGS and non-PIIGS EMU variable 
obtain negative and positive coefficients, respectively, that are significant at 10 percent. These 
estimated coefficients may reflect that the EFSF increases the quality of PIIGS debt while 
reducing the quality of non-PIIGS debt. Regression 4 jointly includes the three debt exposure 
variables and the government debt variable, yielding a positive coefficient for the non-PIIGS 
EMU variable that is significant at 10 percent. In regression 5, the government debt variable is 
the only included explanatory variable, obtaining a negative coefficient that is significant at 10 
percent. In regression 6, the government debt variable, the euro zone dummy and its interaction 
are included, and none of these variables obtains a significant coefficient. Overall, the 
regressions of Table 6, Panel A provide some evidence that the EFSF reduces CDS spreads of 
highly indebted countries and countries with banking systems heavily exposed to PIIGS debt 
rather than non-PIIGS EMU debt. 
In Panel B, the government debt variable is replaced by the fiscal deficit variable. The 
four regressions in Panel B are otherwise analogous to regressions 2 and 4-6 in Panel A. In 
regression 1 of Panel B, the deficit variable is estimated with a coefficient of -16.285 that is 
significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that sovereign CDS spreads of high-deficit countries 
declined relatively much. In regressions 2 and 3, the deficit variable similarly obtains negative 
coefficients that are significant at 10 and 5 percent, respectively. In regression 4, the interaction 
of the fiscal deficit and euro zone dummy obtains a negative and significant coefficient, 
indicating that sovereign CDS spreads declined especially in EMU countries with large public 
deficits. 15 
 
Finally, in Panel C, the sovereign CDS spread is the included public finance variable. 
Throughout, this variable obtains a negative coefficient that is significant at the 1 percent level, 
indicating that countries with high sovereign CDS spreads saw their CDS spreads fall after the 
EFSF announcement. In regressions 2, the non-PIIGS EMU exposure variable obtains a positive 
coefficient that is significant at 5 percent, suggesting that the EFSF announcement may have 
compromised the quality of non-PIIGS EMU debt. In regression 4, the interaction of the 
sovereign CDS spread variable and the euro zone dummy is estimated with a negative and 
significant coefficient. This is evidence that especially EMU countries with high CDS spreads 
saw their spreads decline subsequent to the EFSF announcement. Overall, Table 6 provides 
evidence that sovereign CDS spreads declined more in countries with relatively strained public 
finances, especially if the country belongs to the euro zone. Furthermore, sovereign CDS spreads 
declined more for countries with banking systems heavily exposed to PIIGS debt. 
4  The overall valuation effects of the announcement 
In this section we use the regression results and actual market movements to quantify the 
effects of the event for the market values of bank shares, bank liabilities and bank portfolios of 
sovereign debts. 
Changes in stock valuations are obtained in a standard way: excess returns over the five-
day event window are multiplied by the market value of shares at the beginning of the event 
window. 
Changes in the market values of bank liabilities and sovereign debt portfolios are 
calculated in a somewhat more involved way by capitalizing changes in CDS spreads 
analogously to Veronesi and Zingales (2010). Specifically, we take the change in the market 
value of a debt instrument to be the change in the presented discounted value of the cost of 
insuring the principal against default up to the maturity of the instrument using the CDS market 
as follows
6  
   ∆     ∆ ,                    (1) 
                                                 
6 We ignore that over the event window the market value of a debt instrument may alternatively have changed due to 
a change in the risk-free interest rate. 16 
 
where E is the market value of a debt exposure and I is the market value of insuring against 
default. 
  The present value of the insurance cost is  
      ∑
      
                  ,  
                  (2) 
where      is the amount of existing debt that will not have matured by time  ,      is the risk 
free discount factor,      is the probability of not defaulting up to time  , and   is the maximum 
maturity of the debt. Note that a division by 10 000 is necessary, because CDS spreads are in 
basis points. Equations (1) and (2) imply  
  ∆E     ∑
       
      D t Q  t Z t    ∑
       
      D t Q  t Z t   
   
 
                              (3) 
where subscript 1 denotes values after the event, and subscript 0 denotes values before the event.  
We assume that the instantaneous probability of default is constant. In this case, we 
obtain      from the formula         
  
      
          , where   is the recovery rate in the event of 
default (see the Appendix of Veronesi and Zingales (2010)). The recovery rate is set to 0.6, 
which is a standard assumption in CDS markets. For simplicity, we assume a constant risk-free 
interest rate equal to 2% per annum. The discount factor is then        exp  0.02  , where   
denotes time. We assume that the average maturity of bank liabilities is 5 years for all banks, 
while that of government bonds is 4 years for all countries.
7 Further, we assume that in each year 
the same nominal amount of debt matures, or one fifth of the initial nominal stock of bank 
liabilities and one quarter of the initial stock of government bonds. 
  We first consider the changes in the market value of bank portfolios of PIIGS debt and its 
implication for the market valuation of bank shares and bank liabilities. Specifically, column 1 of 
Panel A of Table 7 provides the changes in the market value of banks’ PIIGS debt – aggregated 
by country of bank location – using the above methodology. The total change in the market value 
of PIIGS debt for the 32 banks in our sample (for which we also have CDS spread data) is 
around 8.7 billion euros.  
Column 2 shows our estimates of the changes in the market value of bank liabilities due 
to exposure to PIIGS sovereign debt. These figures are obtained as follows. Using regression 2 in 
Table 5 we predict banks’ CDS spread changes associated with their PIIGS exposure (as the 
                                                 
7 On average these figures seem to be reasonable, see, for example, The Economist, Cutting it fine, May 7, 2011. 17 
 
product of the coefficient on PIIGS variable and each bank’s exposure to this region). We then 
use equation 3 to obtain an approximation of the change in the market value of bank liabilities. 
The bank liabilities used in this calculation exclude customer deposits, as the valuation of these 
liabilities is not expected to change substantially on account of explicit deposit insurance and a 
high seniority. In the table, we see that the calculated change in the market value of bank 
liabilities associated with their PIIGS exposure is 12.0 billion euros.  
Next, column 3 shows estimates of the change in the market value of bank shares 
associated with their PIIGS exposure, which is calculated as follows. Using regression 2 in Table 
4, we predict the excess returns associated with banks’ exposure to PIIGS government debt. The 
product of these figures and the market values of banks before the event window gives the 
predicted changes in banks’ stock market value. For the entire sample of banks, we calculate the 
change in market value associated with PIIGS debt to be 4.4 billion euros.  
Column 4 adds up the calculated changes in the market values of bank liabilities and 
shares as related to banks’ PIIGS exposure. For the sample as a whole, this total change in the 
value of debt and equity claims on banks is calculated to be 16.5 billion euros. Interestingly, this 
increase in the valuation of overall claims on banks as related to their PIIGS exposure is almost 
double the calculated change in the market value of their PIIGS itself exposure (at 8.7 billion). 
Some of this difference may be due to lower expected bankruptcy costs for banks as borne by 
bank shareholders and liability holders. This would represent an efficiency gain due to the 
announcement. Alternatively, combined bank liability holder and shareholder gains are relatively 
high, as the event increased the fiscal capacity of distressed countries within the euro zone, 
thereby increasing the value of the contingent claim that banks in these countries have on their 
financial safety nets.  
Next, we present some calculations of the changes in the valuation of overall sovereign 
debt portfolios, overall bank liabilities, and overall bank share prices over the five-day event 
window using only market data. Specifically, column 1 of Panel B of Table 7 provides 
calculations of the changes in the overall values of banks’ sovereign debt portfolios – again 
aggregated at the level of the country of bank location. The change in the total value of bank 
sovereign exposures is calculated to be 10.3 billion euros, slightly more than the increase in the 
value of PIIGS exposures of 8.7 billion euros in column 1 of Panel A. In column 2, we see that 
the change in the value of overall bank liabilities is calculated to be 29.0 billion euros. In column 18 
 
3, the change in the market values of the 32 banks is calculated to be -4.0 billion euros. In 
column 4, we see that the sum of the changes in bank liabilities and bank shares adds up to 25.0 
billion euros. This total change in the claims of bank liability and share holders is more than 
double the change in the calculated value of sovereign exposures. The difference can again be 
due to reduced expected bankruptcy costs for the banks themselves or a higher value of 
contingent bank claims on national financial safety nets. The final column in the table provides 
information on the book values of total bank assets for the banks in our sample. Total assets of 
these 32 banks amount to 43.1 trillion euros. The calculated change in the total market valuation 
of bank liabilities and bank shares of 25.0 billion euros amounts to about 0.06 percent of the 
book value of total assets. All the same, for a badly capitalized bank the change in the market 
value of its sovereign exposure could be material. 
5  Conclusion 
This paper examines the impact of the creation of the EFSF on bank share prices, bank 
CDS spreads and sovereign CDS spreads in the EU using an event study methodology. 
Bank share holders and bank liability holders appear to have gained to the extent that 
their banks held the sovereign debts of PIIGS countries. The gains of bank liability holders in 
euro zone countries with weak public finances are estimated to be relatively large, while the 
gains to bank shareholders in such countries are relatively small. The latter result may reflect that 
bank stock investors in euro zone countries with weak public finances expected bailouts of their 
countries that would entail larger prospects for keeping bank equity value intact. 
The division of the overall gains between shareholders and debt holders was uneven. 
Banks’ creditors, in particular, could book large gains as evidenced by decreased average bank 
CDS spreads, while bank shareholders suffered negative average excess returns in a five-day 
event window – after an initial spike in bank share prices immediately after the announcement. 
The announcement of the EFSF thus appears to have reduced expected credit losses on bank 
liabilities, while at the same time reducing shareholder value, perhaps because the EFSF 
announcement did little to reduce bank funding costs for new bank funding. 
Interestingly, the combined gains to bank shareholders and bank liability holders are 
calculated to greatly exceed the increase in the valuation of banks’ sovereign debt portfolios. 19 
 
This suggests that banks benefited from lower expected costs of bank distress, or - more 
substantially - from increased contingent claims on their national financial safety nets. 
Country CDS spreads are found to fall for countries with banks with large PIIGS 
sovereign exposures. At the same time, sovereign CDS spreads decline for countries with weak 
public finances. 
Overall, our results suggest that the creation of the EFSF represents a direct bailout of 
heavily indebted euro zone governments and an indirect bailout of EU banks with large 
exposures to these countries. Other holders of these sovereign debts, and in particular non-EU 
banks, and institutional and private investors, were bailed out as well – at the expense of euro 
zone tax payers. The EFSF, as announced in May 2010, thus was a rather crude and expensive 
way to bail out EU banks with large distressed euro zone sovereign exposures. 
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Appendix 
Table A1. Sovereign exposure to total assets ratios for individual banks in percent. 
The 46 banks in this table correspond to the sample for bank excess return regressions presented in Table 4. 
Country  Bank  Sovereign 
debt exposure to 
assets in percent 
Austria  Erste Group Bank AG  6.08 
Raiffeisen Zentralbank Oesterrreich AG (RZB)  7.52 
Belgium  Dexia  4.85 
KBC Bank  15.64 
Marfin Popular Bank Public Co Ltd  4.42 
Cyprus  Bank Of Cyprus Public Co Ltd  4.09 
Denmark  Danske Bank  2.98 
Jyske Bank  1.15 
Sydbank  0.47 
Finland  Op-Pohjola Group  1.38 
France  Bnp Paribas  0.10 
BPCE Group  11.73 
Credit Agricole Group  1.63 
Societe Generale  1.74 
Germany  Commerzbank AG  4.18 
Deutsche Bank AG  1.06 
Deutsche Postbank AG  3.86 
Landesbank Berlin AG  6.88 
Greece  Agricultural Bank Of Greece S.A. (Atebank)  15.09 
Alpha Bank  3.88 
EFG Eurobank Ergasias S.A.  5.79 
Piraeus Bank Group  7.96 
TT Hellenic Postbank S.A.  14.41 
Hungary  FHB Jelzálogbank Nyilvánosan Mőködı Rt  5.54 
Otp Bank Nyrt.  6.91 
Ireland  Allied Irish Banks Plc  2.64 
Italy  Banco Popolare - S.C.  0.09 
Intesa Sanpaolo  5.24 
Monte Dei Paschi Di Siena  1.92 
Unicredit  4.23 
Unione Di Banche Italiane Scpa (UBI Banca)  2.55 
Malta  Bank Of Valletta (Bov)  7.34 
Netherlands  ING Bank  1.88 22 
 
Poland  Powszechna Kasa Oszczędności Bank Polski S.A. (PKO)  8.07 
Portugal  Banco BPI  6.36 
Banco Comercial Português S.A. (BCP)  1.98 
Espírito Santo Financial Group S.A. (ESFG)  1.27 
Spain  Grupo Santander  2.62 
Sweden  Nordea Bank  1.94 
Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken Ab (SEB)  2.93 
Svenska Handelsbanken  1.62 
Swedbank  0.09 
United Kingdom  Barclays  1.48 
HSBC Holdings Plc  1.68 
Lloyds Banking Group  0.39 
Royal Bank Of Scotland (RBS)  2.57 
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Table A2. Timeline of events surrounding the creation of the EFSF 
Source: Reuters 
Date  News item 
April 11  Euro zone finance ministers approve a 30 billion Euro aid mechanism for Greece, which Athens declines 
to activate. 
April 22  Eurostat says Greece's 2009 budget deficit was 13.6 percent of GDP, not the 12.7 percent it had reported. 
April 23  Papandreou asks for activation of EU/IMF aid. 
April 27  Standard & Poor's downgrades Greece's credit rating to junk status. The next day it downgrades Spain's 
rating because of poor growth prospects. 
  Germany approves a 22.4 billion Euro ($30 billion) share. 
  The package amounts to 110 billion Euros over three years and is the first rescue of a member of the 16-
nation Euro zone. 
May 2  Papandreou says Greece has done a deal with the EU and IMF opening the door to a bailout in exchange 
for extra budget cuts of 30 billion Euros over three years, on top of measures already set. 
May 4/5  Public workers in Greece stage a 48-hour strike. Up to 50,000 protest in Athens. Three people are killed 
when a bank is set on fire. 
May 6  Greek parliament approves latest austerity bill. 
May 9  The IMF unanimously approves its part of the rescue loans, and provides 5.5 billion Euros immediately. 
  The package consists of 440 billion Euros in guarantees from euro zone states, plus 60 billion Euros in a 
European debt instrument. The IMF will contribute 250 billion Euros, taking the total to 750 billion 
Euros, or around $1 trillion. 
May 10  Global policymakers install an emergency financial safety net worth 750 billion Euros to bolster financial 
markets and shore up the Euro against contagion from the Greek crisis. 
May 11  Germany's cabinet approves the biggest national contribution -- 123 billion Euros in loan guarantees -- to 
the safety net. 
May 12  Spanish Prime Minister Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero sets fresh spending cuts of 15 billion Euros in 
2010 and 2011. 
May 13  Portuguese Prime Minister Jose Socrates and opposition leader Pedro Passos Coelho draw up steps to 
slash the country's deficit, including public sector pay cuts. The deficit, which hit 9.4 percent of GDP in 
2009, is targeted to fall to 7.3 percent in 2010 and 4.6 percent in 2011. 
May 18  Germany, in an attack on the financial speculation it blames for the debt crisis, announces a unilateral ban 
on naked short selling of shares in the country's top 10 financial institutions, on Euro government bonds 
and on related transactions in credit default swaps (CDS). 
May 25  Italy's cabinet approves a 24 billion Euro austerity package with the aim of cutting the deficit to 2.7 
percent of GDP in 2012 from 5.3 percent in 2009. 24 
 
May 27  Spain wins parliamentary approval for its 15 billion Euro ($18.4 billion) austerity package by just one 
vote. 
May 28  Fitch cuts Spain's credit rating by one notch to AA+ from AAA after record levels of household and 
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Table A3. Description of variables 
Variable  Description  Source 
Exposure (B)  Bank's consolidated net exposure to EU sovereign debt 
relative to assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
PIIGS (B)  Bank's consolidated net exposure to PIIGS sovereign debt 
relative to assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
non-PIIGS EMU (B)  Bank's consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by non-PIIGS euro zone countries relative to assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
non-EMU (B)  Bank's consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by EU member states outside the euro zone relative to 
assets 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
Exposure (C)  Banks' consolidated net exposure to EU sovereign debt at 
the country level relative to GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
PIIGS (C)  Banks' consolidated net exposure to PIIGS sovereign debt at 
the country level relative to GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
non-PIIGS EMU (C)  Banks' consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by non-PIIGS  euro zone countries at the country level 
relative to GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
non-EMU (C)  Banks' consolidated net exposure to sovereign debt issued 
by EU member states outside the euro zone at the country 
level relative to GDP 
CEBS stress test and 
Bankscope 
Excess return  Five-day stock return minus bank beta times return on 
MSCI world index 
Datastream 
Bank CDS change  Five-day change in the bank's 5-year CDS spread in basis 
points 
Datastream 
Sovereign CDS change  Five-day change in the sovereign's 5-year CDS spread in 
basis points 
Datastream 
Fiscal deficit  General government fiscal deficit in 2009 as a percentage of 
GDP  
Eurostat 
Government debt  General government outstanding debt at the end of 2009 as 
a percentage of GDP  
Eurostat 
Sovereign CDS spread  CDS spread on five-year sovereign bonds as of March 30, 
2010 in basis points 
Datastream 
Euro zone  Dummy variable that equals one if the bank or country is 
located in a euro zone country, and zero otherwise 
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Table 1.  Exposure to sovereign debt issued by PIIGS, non-PIIGS and non-EMU countries 
This table provides information on exposures to sovereign debts of banks aggregated at the level of EU member 
states in billions of euros and as a percentage of bank assets. 
Country 
In billions of euros  As a percentage of total assets 
EMU 
non-EMU  Total 
exposure 
EMU 
non-EMU  Total 
exposure  PIIGS  non-PIIGS  PIIGS  non-PIIGS 
Austria  2.8  18.5  16.0  37.3  0.49   3.21   2.77   6.47  
Belgium  40.0  51.9  20.9  112.7  2.48   3.22   1.30   7.00  
Cyprus  2.3  1.0  0.1  3.3  2.75   1.17   0.17   4.09  
Denmark  1.4  6.3  18.9  26.6  0.15   0.65   1.96   2.75  
Finland  0.1  0.9  0.1  1.0  0.09   1.16   0.13   1.38  
France  24.9  55.3  15.8  96.1  0.26   0.57   0.16   1.00  
Germany  36.2  96.0  12.7  144.9  0.64   1.70   0.22   2.57  
Greece  36.5  0.6  3.3  40.4  6.79   0.11   0.61   7.51  
Hungary  0.0  0.3  5.2  5.5  0.00   0.35   6.46   6.81  
Ireland  5.5  1.8  2.3  9.6  1.52   0.49   0.63   2.64  
Italy  121.0  31.1  13.2  165.2  2.86   0.73   0.31   3.91  
Malta  0.0  0.9  0.0  1.0  0.14   6.94   0.26   7.34  
Netherlands  10.7  29.1  5.6  45.4  0.44   1.20   0.23   1.88  
Poland  0.0  0.0  6.4  6.4  0.00   0.00   8.07   8.07  
Portugal  10.4  0.0  2.0  12.4  2.20   0.01   0.42   2.62  
Spain  54.1  1.8  4.4  60.3  2.35   0.08   0.19   2.62  
Sweden  1.5  15.5  24.4  41.4  0.07   0.67   1.05   1.79  
United Kingdom  28.1  122.6  65.1  215.8  0.22   0.94   0.50   1.66  
Total  375.5  433.5  216.4  1 025.4  0.85   0.98   0.49   2.31  
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Table 2. Means tests of bank excess returns and changes in bank and sovereign CDS spreads 
 
This table provides tests of whether mean bank excess returns, bank CDS spread changes and sovereign  
CDS spread changes as calculated over one-day, three-day and five-day event windows are different from zero.  
Bank excess return is the bank stock excess stock return. Bank CDS change is the change in the 5-year bank  




Event window  Sample mean  Standard deviation  t- statistic  p value 
Bank excess returns  One day  0.0761  0.0065  11.76  0.000 
Three days  0.0372  0.0051  7.28  0.000 
Five days  -0.0136  0.0073  -1.85  0.071 
 
         
Bank CDS changes  One day  -37.9591  8.3636  -4.54  0.000 
Three days  -23.1387  6.3975  -3.62  0.001 
Five days  -23.0790  5.7407  -4.02  0.000 
 
         
Sovereign CDS changes   One day  -54.9585  23.2545  -2.36  0.030 
Three days  -59.4195  25.6265  -2.32  0.033 
Five days  -53.9095  23.8995  -2.26  0.038 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics and correlation matrices  
 
This table provides descriptive statistics and correlation matrices for variables used in the bank stock excess return 
regressions (in Panel A), the bank CDS change regressions (in Panel B), and the sovereign CDS change regressions 
(in Panel C). Bank excess return is the bank stock excess return over a five-day event window. Bank CDS change is 
the change in the bank CDS spread over a five-day event window. Sovereign CDS change is the change in the 5-
year sovereign CDS spread over a five-day event window. Exposure (B), PIIGS (B), non-PIIGS EMU (B) and non-
EMU (B) are a bank's  net sovereign debt exposure relative to assets to all EU countries, PIIGS countries, non-
PIIGS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries. Government debt is general government debt at the end of 2009 as 
a percentage of GDP. Fiscal deficit is the general government fiscal deficit in 2009 as a percentage of GDP. 
Sovereign CDS spread is the five-year sovereign CDS spread on March 30, 2010 of the country in basis points. Euro 
zone is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is located in the euro zone, and zero otherwise. Exposure (C), 
PIIGS (C), non-PIIGS EMU (C) and non-EMU (C) are banks' net sovereign debt exposures to all EU countries, 
PIIGS countries, non-PIIGS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries aggregated to the country level and relative to 
GDP. *, ** and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Sample for bank stock excess return regressions 
 
Descriptive statistics  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Bank excess return  46  -0.01  0.05  -0.11  0.15 
Exposure (B)  46  0.04  0.04  0.00  0.16 
PIIGS (B)  46  0.02  0.03  0.00  0.15 
non-PIIGS EMU (B)  46  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.08 
non-EMU (B)  46  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.08 
Government debt  46  78.13  27.29  41.40  126.80 
Fiscal deficit   46  6.85  4.41  0.90  15.40 
Sovereign CDS spread   46  163.99  217.21  26.49  751.38 




























Bank excess return  1                 
Exposure (B)  0.26*  1               
PIIGS (B)  0.50***  0.70***  1             
non-PIIGS EMU (B)  -0.16  0.46***  -0.13  1           
non-EMU (B)  -0.18  0.39***  -0.19  0.16  1         
Government debt  0.30**  0.43***  0.64***  -0.08  -0.16  1       
Fiscal deficit  0.40***  0.29**  0.59***  -0.27*  -0.15  0.56***  1     
Sovereign CDS spread  0.36**  0.47***  0.76***  -0.28*  -0.08  0.68***  0.75***  1   
Euro zone  0.47***  0.28*  0.39***  0.25*  -0.37**  0.56***  0.24  0.29*  1 29 
 
 
Panel B. Sample for bank CDS spread change regressions 
 
Descriptive statistics  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Bank CDS change  32  -27.14  41.04  -166.06  11.77 
Exposure (B)  32  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.16 
PIIGS (B)  32  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.07 
non-PIIGS EMU (B)  32  0.01  0.02  0.00  0.08 
non-EMU (B)  32  0.01  0.01  0.00  0.04 
Government debt   32  78.28  25.99  41.40  126.80 
Fiscal deficit   32  6.83  4.27  0.90  15.40 
Sovereign CDS spread   32  133.61  176.08  32.94  751.38 




























Bank CDS change  1                 
Exposure (B)  -0.02  1               
PIIGS (B)  -0.37**  0.54***  1             
non-PIIGS EMU (B)  0.27  0.76***  -0.09  1           
non-EMU (B)  0.15  0.69***  -0.05  0.66***  1         
Government debt  -0.24  0.28  0.60***  -0.05  -0.18  1       
Fiscal deficit  -0.53***  0.01  0.43**  -0.29  -0.24  0.37**  1     
Sovereign CDS spread  -0.70***  0.20  0.69***  -0.29  -0.15  0.57***  0.65***  1   
Euro zone  -0.36**  0.33*  0.43**  0.16  -0.0734  0.61***  0.16  0.31*  1 
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Panel C. Sample for sovereign CDS spread change regressions  
 
Descriptive statistics  Obs  Mean  Std. Dev.  Min  Max 
Sovereign CDS change  18  -53.91  101.40  -387.43  0.03 
Exposure (C)  18  0.11  0.08  0.01  0.33 
PIIGS (C)  18  0.04  0.05  0.00  0.16 
non-PIIGS EMU (C)  18  0.04  0.05  0.00  0.16 
non-EMU (C)  18  0.03  0.03  0.00  0.08 
Government debt   18  70.27  23.53  41.40  126.80 
Fiscal deficit   18  6.66  4.16  0.90  15.40 
Sovereign CDS spread   18  136.07  167.13  26.49  751.38 




























Sovereign CDS change  1                 
Exposure (C)  -0.06  1               
PIIGS (C)  -0.60***  0.61***  1             
non-PIIGS EMU (C)  0.39  0.75***  0.06  1           
non-EMU (C)  0.23  0.39  -0.19  0.23  1         
Government debt  -0.59**  0.37  0.64***  0.06  -0.21  1       
Fiscal deficit  -0.67***  -0.01  0.48**  -0.29  -0.37  0.42*  1     
Sovereign CDS spread  -0.93***  0.15  0.63***  -0.29  -0.22  0.65***  0.65***  1   
Euro zone  -0.25  0.12  0.44*  0.13  -0.66***  0.38  0.21  0.19  1 
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Table 4. Determinants of bank excess returns 
The dependent variable is the bank stock excess return over a five-day event window. Exposure (B), PIIGS (B), non-
PIIGS EMU (B) and non-EMU (B) are a bank's net sovereign debt exposure relative to assets to all EU countries, 
PIIGS countries, non-PIIGS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries. Government debt is general government debt 
at the end of 2009 as a percentage of GDP in the country where the bank is headquartered. Fiscal deficit is the 
general government fiscal deficit in 2009 as a percentage of GDP in the country where the bank is headquartered. 
CDS spread is the five-year sovereign CDS spread on March 30, 2010 of the country where the bank is 
headquartered in basis points. Euro zone is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is located in the euro zone, 
and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Exposure (B) 
0.338               
(0.353)               
PIIGS (B)    0.726***  0.759***  0.611***  0.843***  0.865***  0.640**  0.740*** 
  (0.132)  (0.146)  (0.144)  (0.203)  (0.136)  (0.272)  (0.277) 
non-PIIGS EMU (B)    -0.224  -0.223  -0.154  -0.275  -0.769*  -0.805  -0.633 
  (0.480)  (0.481)  (0.515)  (0.510)  (0.428)  (0.611)  (0.532) 
non-EMU (B)    -0.219  -0.224  -0.214  -0.194  0.072  0.282  -0.119 
  (0.306)  (0.310)  (0.308)  (0.305)  (0.376)  (0.220)  (0.587) 
Government debt      0.000      0.001**     
    (0.000)      (0.001)     
Government debt * 
Euro zone 
          -0.002***     
          (0.001)     
Fiscal deficit        0.002      0.005***   
      (0.002)      (0.001)   
Fiscal deficit * Euro 
zone 
            -0.007**   
            (0.003)   
Sovereign CDS 
spread 
        0.000      0.000 
        (0.000)      (0.000) 
Sovereign CDS 
spread * Euro zone 
              0.000 
              (0.000) 
Euro zone            0.186***  0.086***  0.064*** 
          (0.040)  (0.031)  (0.021) 
Constant 
-0.028*  -0.023*  -0.018  -0.032  -0.021  -0.110***  -0.074***  -0.062*** 
(0.016)  (0.013)  (0.037)  (0.021)  (0.015)  (0.033)  (0.017)  (0.017) 
R
2  0.0686  0.2687  0.269  0.28  0.273  0.53  0.446  0.419 
N  46  46  46  46  46  46  46  46 
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Table 5. Determinants of bank CDS spread changes 
The dependent variable is the change in the bank CDS spread over a five-day event window. Exposure (B), PIIGS 
(B), non-PIIGS EMU (B) and non-EMU (B) are a bank's net sovereign debt exposure relative to assets to all EU 
countries, PIIGS countries, non-PIIGS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries. Government debt is general 
government debt at the end of 2009 as a percentage of GDP in the country where the bank is headquartered . Fiscal 
deficit is the general government fiscal deficit in 2009 as a percentage of GDP in the country where the bank is 
headquartered. CDS spread is the five-year sovereign CDS spread on March 30, 2010 of the country where the bank 
is headquartered in basis points. Euro zone is a dummy variable that equals one if a bank is located in the euro zone, 
and zero otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the country level are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
Exposure (B) 
-22.19               
(124.0)               
PIIGS (B)    -761.6**  -718.9**  -401.6  435.9  -596.2**  286.0  659.7 
  (307.1)  (343.7)  (541.1)  (467.7)  (261.0)  (494.2)  (504.6) 
non-PIIGS EMU (B)    587.206*  600.7  409.7  106.9  933.9**  155.5  348.5 
  (349.3)  (374.3)  (310.7)  (244.3)  (472.3)  (296.1)  (315.0) 
non-EMU (B)    -176.7  -213.0  -326.7  11.728  -600.9  -142.8  -286.9 
  (452.8)  (405.0)  (389.5)  (349.8)  (641.7)  (232.3)  (471.0) 
Government debt      -0.051      -0.006     
    (0.454)      (0.223)     
Government debt * 
Euro zone 
          0.334     
          (0.691)     
Fiscal deficit        -3.964      0.321*   
      (2.780)      (0.171)   
Fiscal deficit * Euro 
zone 
            -9.077***   
            (2.723)   
Sovereign CDS 
spread 
        -0.193***      0.038 
        (0.022)      (0.108) 
Sovereign CDS 
spread * Euro zone 
              -0.224** 
              (0.112) 
Euro zone            -57.76  26.54*  -14.12 
          (56.77)  (15.01)  (14.96) 
Constant 
-26.39**  -22.27*  -18.76  2.971  -8.987  -4.873  -6.072**  -6.817 
(12.830)  (11.450)  (30.778)  (11.240)  (10.160)  (15.231)  (2.602)  (8.943) 
R
2  0  0.196  0.196  0.323  0.518  0.303  0.565  0.577 
N  32  32  32  32  32  32  32  32 
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Table 6. Determinants of sovereign CDS spreads 
 
The dependent variable is the change in the 5-year sovereign CDS spread over a five-day event window. Exposure 
(C), PIIGS (C), non-PIIGS EMU (C) and non-EMU (C) are banks' net sovereign debt exposures to all EU countries, 
PIIGS countries, non-PIIGS, EMU countries and non-EMU countries aggregated to the country level and relative to 
GDP. In Panel A, government debt is general government at the end of 2009 as a percentage of GD. In Panel B, 
fiscal deficit is the general government fiscal deficit in 2009 as a percentage of GDP. In Panel C, sovereign CDS 
spread is the five-year sovereign CDS spread on March 30, 2010 in basis points. Euro zone a dummy variable that 
equals one if a country is in the EMU and zero otherwise. Standard errors are in parentheses. *, ** and *** denote 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Government debt as fiscal variable 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
Exposure (C) 
-72.87974  247.3         
(278.065)  (-214.4)         
PIIGS (C) 
    -1269.0*  -806.7     
    (652.4)  (-603.3)     
non-PIIGS EMU (C) 
    906.6*  938.6**     
    (473.7)  (-460.9)     
non-EMU (C) 
    46.63  -86.0     
    (450.29)  (-490.6)     
Government debt 
  -2.841*    -1.576  -2.540*  -0.185 
  (-1.523)    (-1.341)  (1.389)  (0.173) 
Government debt * Euro zone 
          -2.661 
          (1.737) 
Euro zone 
          149.2 
          (115.7) 
             
Constant 
-45.89  118.5  -42.21*  52.20  124.6  -3.194 
(26.426)  (-87.8)  (20.031)  (-76.3)  (85.04)  (9.415) 
R
2  0.003  0.378  0.543  0.620  0.348  0.387 
N  18  18  18  18  18  18 34 
 
 
Panel B. Fiscal deficit as fiscal variable 
 




   
(-202.1)       
PIIGS (C)   
-914.1     
  (-587.6)     
non-PIIGS EMU (C)   
690.9     
  (-449.6)     
non-EMU (C)   
-250.2     
  (-499.5)     
Fiscal deficit 
-16.285**  -9.422*  -16.277**  -0.058 
(-7.366)  (-5.504)  (7.286)  (0.934) 
Fiscal deficit * Euro zone        -20.56** 
      (8.841) 
Euro zone        91.67** 
      (46.06) 
Constant 
63.05  23.48  54.424  -13.27** 
(-48.66)  (-37.28)  (34.769)  (5.753) 
R
2  0.449  0.637  0.445  0.584 
N  18  18  18  18 35 
 
Panel C. Sovereign CDS spread as fiscal variable 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Exposure (C) 
109.3       
(108.6)       
PIIGS (C)    -170.4     
  (323.9)     
non-PIIGS EMU (C)    332.6**     
  (145.9)     
non-EMU (C)    6.076     
  (240.3)     
Sovereign CDS spread 
-0.570***  -0.503***  -0.563***  -0.092*** 
(0.042)  (0.076)  (0.039)  (0.020) 
Sovereign CDS spread * Euro 
zone 
      -0.481*** 
      (0.052) 
Euro zone        24.99** 
      (10.542) 
Constant 
11.678  7.248  22.68***  -5.617* 
(12.856)  (12.639)  (6.673)  (2.873) 
R
2  0.867  0.881  0.861  0.890 




Table 7.  Estimated changes in market value of banks’ sovereign debt holding, shares and 
liabilities 
This table provides estimates of change in the values of sovereign exposures, bank liabilities and bank shares related 
to changes in values of PIIGS debts (in Panel A) and to changes in values of all EU sovereign debts (in Panel B). 
Figures are calculated for 32 banks that we have CDS spread data for and are aggregated to the country level. 
Figures are based on market movements in the five-day event window. dE PIIGS is the change in the market value 
of banks’ PIIGS government bonds based on actual CDS spread changes. Predicted dB PIIGS is the predicted 
change in the market value of banks’ liabilities due to PIIGS sovereign debt exposure based on regression 2 in Table 
5. Predicted dMV PIIGS is the predicted change in banks’ stock market value due to PIIGS sovereign debt exposure 
based on regression 2 in Table 4. dE Total is the change in the market value of banks’ European government bonds, 
based on actual CDS spread changes. dB Total is the change in the market value of banks’ liabilities based on actual 
bank CDS spread changes. dMV Total is the change in banks’ stock market value based on actual stock market 
movements. Total assets of banks in sample is the sum of total assets of the 32 banks in the sample.  
 






   
Country  dE PIIGS 
(EUR millions) 
(1) 
Predicted dB PIIGS 
(EUR millions) 
(2) 
Predicted dMV PIIGS 
(EUR millions) 
(3) 
Predicted dB PIIGS + 




Austria  95  65  57  123 
Belgium  961  1 629  459  2 088 
Denmark  23  65  14  79 
France  725  1 061  155  1 216 
Germany  749  994  131  1 126 
Netherlands  360  266  79  345 
Sweden  48  54  27  81 
United Kingdom  809  793  371  1 164 
         
Portugal  517  321  95  416 
Ireland  113  147  13  160 
Italy  2 030  4 818  1 687  6 505 
Greece  878  167  157  324 
Spain  1 421  1 616  1 178  2 793 
         
Total non-PIIGS  3 769  4 927  1 294  6 222 
Total PIIGS  4 960  7 068  3 130  10 198 
         
Total  8 729  11 995  4 424  16 419 37 
 
 Panel B. Changes on account of all sovereign debt 
 
 














of banks in sample 
(EUR billions) 
(5) 
Austria  203  69  60  129  577 
Belgium  1 224  528  -1 821  -1 293  1 523 
Denmark  74  222  -1 143  -921  860 
France  933  12 720  1 613  14 333  9 627 
Germany  966  3 525  -482  3 043  5 165 
Netherlands  474  -922  701  -221  2 415 
Sweden  121  787  -2 974  -2187  2 314 
United Kingdom  1 202  882  -2 938  -2056  12 978 
           
Greece  886  423  -23  400  257 
Ireland  126  632  -41  591  362 
Italy  2 157  1 773  -11  1 762  4 226 
Portugal  528  2 323  264  2 587  474 
Spain  1 434  6 013  2 826  8 839  2 305 
           
Total non-PIIGS  5 199  17 812  -6 983  10 829  35 458 
Total PIIGS  5 132  11 164  3 016  14 180  7 624 
           
Total  10 331  28 976  -3 968  25 008  43 082 38 
 
 
   
Figure 1.  Average bank stock cumulative excess returns 
 







































Figure 2. Average 5-year bank CDS spreads  
 



























Figure 3. Average 5-year sovereign CDS spreads  
 
Sovereign CDS spreads are weighted by general government debts at the end of 2009. 
 
 


























Figure 4. Mean bank stock cumulative excess returns, bank CDS spreads, and sovereign CDS 
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